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Motivating compliance behavior among offenders: Procedural justice or deterrence?  
 
Abstract 
Research shows that procedural justice can motivate compliance behavior through the 
mediating influence of either legitimacy or social identity. Yet few studies examine the relative 
importance of these two mediators in the same analysis. Using three waves of longitudinal 
survey data collected from 359 tax offenders we examine: (a) whether procedural justice is 
important to offenders’ decisions to comply with their future tax obligations over and above 
fear of sanctions; and (b) whether legitimacy and social identity processes mediate the 
relationship between procedural justice and compliance. Our results reveal that: (1) legitimacy 
mediates the effect of procedural justice on compliance; (2) social identity mediates the 
procedural justice/compliance relationship; (3) identity seems to matter slightly more than 
perceptions of legitimacy when predicting tax compliance; (4) perceived risk of sanction plays 
a small but counterproductive role in predicting tax compliance. We conclude that normative 
concerns dominate taxpayers’ compliance decisions. Our findings have implications for 
understanding compliance behavior, but also for conceptualizing why and how procedural 
justice can motivate such behavior. 
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Introduction 
There are many reasons why people obey laws. For some, compliance is instrumental in nature 
– it is motivated by fear of consequences should they be detected violating a law. For others, 
law-abiding behavior is elicited by an intrinsic motivation to follow rules because of the belief 
that it is right to do so. On this account, compliance is motivated by normative concerns, such 
as seeing one’s self as a law-abiding citizen or holding a corresponding belief in the legitimacy 
of the authority enforcing those laws. In this paper we contrast the instrumental versus 
normative perspectives of compliance. We do so in a context where non-compliance has been 
found to be rife – the taxation context (Braithwaite; 2003; Braithwaite, Schneider, Reinhart & 
Murphy 2003). We draw on three waves of survey data collected from taxpayers who have been 
caught and punished for serious tax evasion to examine which of the motivators of compliance 
best captures their willingness to comply with tax laws in the future. Before proceeding to 
discuss our findings we first provide a review of the literature. 
 
Motivating compliance: Deterrence or procedural justice? 
Many regulatory and criminal justice systems are based on the premise that individuals are 
rational actors, driven to comply with laws and regulations out of fear of the consequences for 
doing otherwise. This instrumental, or deterrence-based, perspective of human behavior 
suggests that individuals weigh up the costs and benefits associated with obeying the law 
(Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Gibbs 1968; Tittle 1969). If the costs of non-compliance 
outweigh the benefits associated with compliance then the rational choice will be to comply 
with the law. In contrast, if the benefits associated with non-compliance outweigh the potential 
costs then non-compliance will be the rational choice. Advocates of this perspective suggest 
that non-compliance will be viewed as the risky choice if: 1) the risk of detection for non-
compliance is high; 2) the severity of sanctions associated with rule-breaking is high; and 3) 
non-compliance is dealt with swiftly by authorities (Becker 1968). Proponents of the 
instrumental perspective therefore suggest that non-compliance can be deterred by increasing 
 3 
both the probability of detection for wrong-doing and the severity of sanctions should wrong-
doing be detected. 
On balance, however, research suggests that increasing the severity of potential 
punishments will have limited effect (Doob & Webster 2003; Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle & 
Madensen 2008). Rather, increasing the probability of detection has been found to have greater 
success in deterring would-be offenders from violating laws (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein 
1998; Nagin 2013). Yet, in many regulatory contexts the probability of being caught and 
punished for violating rules and laws is low. In the taxation context, for example, the 
probability of being detected evading taxes is extremely low. Estimates from the US and 
Australia indicate that fewer than 5% of the population have their tax affairs audited in any one 
year (Marshall, Smith & Armstrong, 1997; Slemrod, Blumenthal & Christian 2001). In such a 
context, the actual risk of detection for non-compliance is unlikely to substantially influence an 
individual’s decision to comply with their legal obligations. What regulators rely on, therefore, 
is regulatees perceiving the risk of detection and sanction to be high. In fact, research has found 
that individuals can also be strongly deterred from committing criminal acts if they perceive 
legal sanctions to be certain, swift or severe (Williams & Hawkins 1986).  
Studies show that risk perceptions can be influenced by personal experience. For 
example, Paternoster and Piquero (1995) argue that if someone offends but is not detected or 
punished for the offence, then their perception of sanction risk will fall. Anwar and Loughran 
(2011) likewise suggest that if one were to be sanctioned for an offence, or see someone else 
being sanctioned, their perceived risk of being detected and sanctioned will be enhanced. But 
Anwar and Loughran also argue that persistent offenders can respond differently to deterrence. 
They showed empirically that serious offenders who had been arrested numerous times in the 
past were less concerned with sanction risk than less persistent or less serious offenders.  In 
short, an individual’s offending experiences can affect their risk perception and response to that 
perception. 
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Actual and perceived risk of sanctions can also indirectly affect law-abiding behavior 
through the perceived informal sanctions they can elicit. Grasmick and Bursik (1990) argue that 
shame emotions imposed by significant others can contribute to the effectiveness of deterrence 
measures. This is because the negative judgment of significant others matters more to an 
offender (Akers 1994). Anderson, Chiricos and Waldo (1977) identified that informal networks 
(e.g., family or neighborhood structures) indeed had a stronger impact on deterring wrong-
doing than actual or perceived deterrence imparted by the state. Such informal sanctioning can 
therefore have a multiplicative effect on deterring offences.  
While the deterrence literature has a long history, an alternative perspective that 
attempts to explain people’s compliance behavior is the procedural justice perspective. 
Procedural justice theory is premised on a different account of offending behavior -  one that 
can provide an explanation as to why people comply with the law even if there might be little 
actual or perceived chance they will be detected breaking laws. Tyler (1990) has argued that 
legal authorities can promote law-abiding behavior through utilizing procedural justice in their 
dealings with the public. Tyler has consistently found that if authorities are neutral in their 
decision-making, if they treat people with fairness, dignity and respect, and provide citizens 
with an opportunity to voice concerns to authorities (i.e., all elements of procedural justice) 
then people will view that authority as more morally appropriate and entitled to be obeyed; that 
is, they will view the authority as more legitimate. Tyler also shows that people will be less 
likely to violate laws if authorities are viewed as legitimate (Tyler 1990; see also Murphy, 
Tyler & Curtis 2009; Jackson et al. 2012a).  Tyler (2006) argues that people who believe that 
authorities are the rightful holders of power (i.e., that they have legitimacy) will be more likely 
to be law-abiding because they internalize the moral value that it is right and just to obey those 
authorities and the law. 
A rapidly growing number of procedural justice studies conducted across different 
countries, regulatory contexts, and population groups have found that such normative-based 
concerns seem to be the more powerful force for predicting people’s compliance behavior. For 
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example, in the USA, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that New Yorker’s perceptions of 
police legitimacy were shaped predominantly by whether they viewed police as procedurally 
just. Perceptions about the effectiveness of police to deter and prevent crime were less 
important. These perceptions of legitimacy went on to positively influence New Yorker’s self-
reported compliance with the law. Similarly, Reisig, Tankebe and Mesko’s (2014) study in 
Slovenia showed that procedural justice was also the main predictor of police legitimacy, which 
in turn was linked to self-reported compliance behavior. Importantly, procedural justice in their 
study was found to be the more important predictor of compliance than deterrence concerns 
(see also Bradford, Hohl, Jackson & MacQueen 2015; Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett & Tyler 
2013; Mazerolle, Bennet, Antrobus & Eggins 2012; Reisig, Bratton & Gertz 2007; Tankebe 
2009).  A small number of studies have also examined the link between procedural justice and 
compliance using offender samples. For example, Paternoster, Brame, Bachman and Sherman 
(1997) found that domestic violence perpetrators were less likely to reoffend after being 
arrested if they perceived the police officers that arrested them to be procedurally just. 
Papachristos, Meares and Fagan (2012) also found that violent offenders were less likely to 
report carrying a gun if they viewed police as legitimate and if they viewed police to be using 
procedural justice (for research with adolescent offenders see Piquero et al 2005; Gau & 
Brunson 2010). Finally, in an observational study, McCluskey, Mastrofski and Parks (1999) 
found that misbehaving citizens were more likely to acquiesce to the commands of police 
officers if they viewed police to be using procedural justice during the encounter. 
Research in non-policing contexts has revealed similar findings. For example, Reisig 
and Mesko (2009) studied prisoners in Slovenia, and found that their perceptions of procedural 
justice within the prison were positively associated with both self-reported and actual records 
of compliance in prison (see also Brunton-Smith & McCarthy, 2015). In a study of corporate 
compliance, Braithwaite and Makkai (1994) revealed that nursing home managers were more 
likely to comply with regulatory standards if they felt nursing home inspectors had previously 
 6 
treated them with procedural justice. Those managers who felt that inspectors had used heavy-
handed deterrence threats were less compliant in a follow-up inspection.   
Procedural justice theory has also been applied successfully to understand tax 
compliance behavior. Murphy (2005), for example, revealed that procedural justice imparted by 
a tax authority strongly predicted tax offenders’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the tax 
authority, which in turn influenced tax offenders’ self-reported compliance behavior; those who 
viewed the Tax Office as more legitimate were less likely to report evading taxes. Interestingly, 
there was no relationship between offence history and subsequent tax non-compliance in 
Murphy’s (2005) study, suggesting that prior sanction experience played no deterrent role in 
subsequent compliance behavior. Similar findings have been obtained when examining actual 
tax compliance behavior. In a randomized controlled trial, Wenzel (2006) found that tax 
offenders were significantly more likely to comply with the tax authority’s request for 
compliance, and were less likely to complain about their treatment, if they received 
correspondence from the Tax Office that emphasized procedural justice messages. Taxpayers 
who received standard correspondence from the tax authority (i.e., the letter emphasized 
sanctions for non-compliance) were more likely to make complaints and were less likely to 
comply with the tax authority’s request (see also Wenzel 2004).  
In summary, the above-mentioned studies represent only a sample of those that have 
found a positive link between procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance. What they show 
is that procedural justice seems to be more important than deterrence in predicting compliance 
behavior. 
 
Legitimacy and social identity as important mediating variables 
One important aspect of procedural justice theory is the role that legitimacy plays in the 
procedural justice/compliance relationship. Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that 
an authority’s legitimacy is an important mediating factor in the procedural justice/compliance 
relationship (e.g., Tyler 1990; Sunshine & Tyler 2003; Reisig et al 2014). This relationship is 
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important because it suggests that people feel compelled to comply with laws if they view the 
authority enforcing the law to be legitimate. When citizens recognize the legitimacy of an 
authority they believe that the authority has the right to prescribe and enforce law-abiding 
behavior. This results in a corresponding obligation to bring one’s behavior into line with what 
is expected under the law. Hence, authorities can best motivate compliance behavior through 
building public perceptions of their legitimacy.  Legitimacy is best promoted when authorities 
use procedural justice with citizens.  
We examine whether legitimacy mediates the statistical effect of procedural justice 
on compliance, but we also examine whether social identity is a mediating factor. Social 
psychologists have attempted to explain why procedural justice might have the positive effects 
that it does. These scholars argue that the exercise of fair treatment by an authority strengthens 
the social bonds between those in power, those they have power over, and the broader social 
group to which both belong. In other words, procedurally just treatment promotes an 
individual’s social identification with the power holder and the group that the power holder 
represents (Tyler & Blader 2003; Huo 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind 1996; Bradford 2014; 
Bradford, Murphy & Jackson 2014; Bradford, Hohl, Jackson & MacQueen, 2015; Murphy 
2013; Murphy, Sargeant & Cherney 2015).  
Identification can take many forms and people often identify with many different 
groups, sometimes simultaneously. For example, one can identify as being a mother, an 
Australian, as a member of an ethnic or racial minority group, or as a law-abiding citizen. The 
context matters and will determine which identity becomes prominent in that situation. 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner 2001), strong identification with a 
particular group will activate the roles, norms and responsibilities expected of an individual 
within that group. In a law enforcement context, adhering to the group’s norms may include 
obeying the laws of the group, respecting authorities, and being a law-abiding citizen in that 
group. Group norms relate to the moral norms that would be expected of people in society.  
Key to this identity-based argument is the idea that procedural justice communicates 
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to people information about their status and value within society. Being held in good standing 
encourages one to align one’s beliefs and behavior with the wider group. It also encourages 
people to support and work with groups they identify strongly with. In other words, 
identification will motivate law-abiding behavior because members of social groups are 
motivated to behave in ways that are expected of them from other group members and because 
they draw value, status and self-worth from these roles and relationships (Tajfel & Turner 
2001). This process suggests that people internalize the norms and values of the group to which 
they belong; regarding a group authority as legitimate and abiding by the laws of that group are 
two such norms that are expected of group members (Horne 2009). 
The Group Engagement Model (Tyler & Blader 2003) specifically proposes that 
procedural justice can shape and strengthen social identification with a group, which results in 
greater propensity to comply with the groups’ norms and rules. Social identity in the Group 
Engagment Model therefore mediates the relationship between procedural justice and people’s 
attitudes and behaviors. This perspective also suggests that social identities are changeable over 
time depending on the type of treatment one receives from a group representative. Fair 
treatment can enhance social identification while unfair treatment can diminish social 
identification. We adopt this account for thinking about the relationship between procedural 
justice, social identity and subsequent behavior. We propose that tax authorities (like other 
authorities) have the capability to influence the law-abiding identities of those they come into 
contact with through the way in which they treat them (c.f., Bradford 2014; Bradford et al 2014; 
Blackwood, Hopkins & Reicher 2013). We also suggest that these law-abiding identities can 
directly influence taxpayers’ propensity to comply with legal rules (c.f., Bradford et al 2015).  
Such suggestions are not dissimilar to arguments put forth by labelling theories. 
Labelling theories argue that negative system contact can result in delinquency, just as positive 
system contact can result in diminished offending (e.g., McAra & McVie 2007; Wiley & 
Esbensen 2013). According to labelling theories this occurs because system contact has the 
potential to stigmatize individuals and promote delinquent identities (Braithwaite 1989); these 
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delinquent identities in turn result in individuals rejecting mainstream values and norms, which 
can lead to the potential for re-offending. We suggest that procedurally unfair treatment 
experienced during system contact has the potential to stigmatize individuals and reduce law-
abiding identities, which will loosen the social bonds that promote law-abiding behavior. 
Finally, identities may also directly influence compliance behavior because those 
who identify more strongly with a group will place greater weight on ensuring the outcomes of 
their group are favorable (Bradford et al 2015). Not paying one’s taxes, while beneficial to an 
individual, is likely to be detrimental to the group as a whole; fewer taxes mean fewer resources 
that can be distributed to the group to pay for public goods. Strong identification with a group is 
thus likely to promote the groups’ interests. This includes alignment with the expected roles and 
obligations of the group, and compliance with the group’s laws.  
 
Present Study 
The overarching aim of this study is to examine how normative and instrumental concerns 
motivate tax offenders’ decisions to comply with their subseqent tax obligations. We also aim 
to examine whether social identity and offenders’ perceptions of the tax authority’s legitimacy 
each mediate the effect of procedural justice on compliance behavior, and explore which proves 
to be the more important mediator. The taxation context is interesting to examine because of the 
widely held assumption that taxpayer behavior is most likely driven by instrumental concerns. 
If normative concerns are found to dominate tax offenders’ decision to comply with their tax 
obligations in the future, over and above their concerns about being sanctioned, then this 
provides convincing evidence regarding the widespread applicability of the normative model of 
compliance.  
The theoretical innovation of our study is to study the importance of social identity 
processes in the context of a procedural justice account of compliance. This focus is a relatively 
under-explored aspect of procedural justice theory (in the criminology context at least) and thus 
allows us to test the relative importance of social identity to explaining compliance behavior. Of 
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particular interest is to test the relative importance of identity versus legitimacy as a predictor of 
compliance behavior. Based on our review of the literature, we test three main hypotheses: 
H1) Normative concerns (i.e., legitimacy; identity) will more strongly predict tax 
compliance behavior than perceived risk of sanction.  
H2) Perceptions of legitimacy will mediate the effect of procedural justice on tax 
compliance behavior.  
H3) Social identity will mediate the effect of procedural justice on tax compliance 
behavior.  
 
Methods and Data 
Sample and Procedure 
We use three waves of survey data collected over a period of six years from the same tax 
offenders. The fact that we have three waves of survey data is a strength of our study. Most 
studies in the procedural justice literature rely solely on cross-sectional survey data. The causal 
relationships between variables cannot be ascertained in such studies. With longitudinal data we 
will be able to demonstrate whether perceptions of procedural justice experienced during a 
sanctioning event predict a strengthening (or diminishing) of a law-abiding identity and 
perceptions of the Tax Office’s legitimacy over time, and whether these variables in turn predict 
subsequent tax compliance behavior over and above perceptions of deterrence. One’s ability to 
make causal claims is strengthened somewhat with longitudinal data because, in such a research 
design, confounders must be time-varying, intra-individual factors.  
All of our respondents had been caught and sanctioned for involvement in aggressive 
tax avoidance schemes (it was the first tax offence for 43% of our sample; see Murphy 2003). 
To undertake the study it required working closely with the Australian Tax Office (ATO) to 
draw the sample. Given privacy legislation in Australia prohibits individuals outside of the 
ATO having access to the names and contact details of tax offenders, the ATO drew a random 
sample of 6,000 of the 42,000 known taxpayers involved (sampling was stratified by State and 
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Territory jurisdiction across Australia). The ATO sent correspondence to the sample, inviting 
them to participate in the study. Respondents were advised to return their completed survey to 
the first author’s University address. A series of reminder letters was sent by the ATO to non-
responsive taxpayers over six months. A total of 2,301 taxpayers returned a completed survey, 
and after adjusting for taxpayers who were not contactable (did not live at the address listed in 
the ATO’s database; N=677), a response rate of 43% was achieved. The representativeness of 
the sample was confirmed by comparing both the gender and state of residence of survey 
respondents to the overall offender population in the ATO’s database (Murphy & Byng 2002)1. 
Respondents were asked if they would be willing to participate in future research. 
1,250 wave 1 respondents agreed, and provided their name and contact details direct to the first 
author. Two years later, these respondents were sent an invitation to participate in wave 2 of the 
study. 659 taxpayers returned a completed wave 2 survey. Adjusting for people who were no 
longer contactable at wave 2 (N=146), a wave 2 response rate of 60% was achieved (Murphy & 
Murphy 2010). Finally, four years after the wave 2 survey was completed, the original 1,250 
respondents who agreed to be followed-up at wave 1 (minus those who were not contactable at 
wave 2; N=146) were recontacted again and invited to participate in the final wave of the study. 
For the 1,112 taxpayers recontacted at wave 3, 478 completed surveys were received. Adjusting 
for those no longer contactable at wave 3 (N=178), a wave 3 response rate of 52% was achieved 
(Murphy, Murphy & Mearns 2010).  
The data utilized in the present study relates to survey responses from taxpayers who 
participated in all three waves (N=379). For the final sample of 379 respondents, 84% were 
men, the average age of respondents was 49.40 years (SD=8.47 years; age range = 25 to 72), 
47.5% had a university degree; 87% were in employment, and 83% were married. The average 
annual income for respondents was A$87,830 (SD=A$47,750).  
 
 
                                                        
1
 The ATO only provided the proportion of men and women in the tax offender population and the proportion 
of taxpayers who lived in each of the seven states and territories of Australia.  
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Survey instrument and measures 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using Mplus 7.1 was used to construct and validate the 
measures used in the current paper. Table A1 shows the question wordings and factor loadings 
for each concept. It also presents the means and standard deviations for each latent variable. The 
Cronbach alpha scores and model fit statistics for the CFA reveal that all factors and scales, 
except the legitimacy scale, were strong and reliable (the RMSEA score was less than 0.05; the 
TLI and CFI scores were greater than 0.95). The factors were: (a) procedural justice (wave 1); 
(b) ATO legitimacy, stigmatization, social identity, personal taxpaying morality (wave 2); and 
(c) self-reported tax compliance (wave 3). All measures were recorded on a 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) Likert scale. Perceived risk of sanction for tax offending (wave 
2) was measured on a 1 (0% chance of being caught) to 5 (100% chance of being caught) scale. 
Bi-variate correlations between these scales and variables are presented in Table A2. Note that 
all latent variables (except stigmatization) were coded such that a higher score indicated more 
favorable responses (i.e., more procedural justice; more legitimacy; etc). Higher stigmatization 
scores indicated taxpayers felt more stigmatized. Each latent variable was calculated by 
summing the responses to each scale question and dividing by the number of survey items in 
that scale. Missing data for our measures was handled through MPlus using the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure to replace missing values. Only cases with no responses were 
excluded. Missing data were typically low, with less than 1% missing data for most attitudinal 
questions. 
The procedural justice scale was measured via a 10-item scale that assessed 
taxpayers’ perceptions of the ATO’s use of procedural justice (the four procedural justice 
elements of neutrality, fairness, respect and voice were measured). The 4-item ATO legitimacy 
scale reflected taxpayers’ feelings of obligation to follow the directives of the ATO and the 
degree of respect they had for the ATO. We acknowledge the recent debate regarding the 
legitimacy concept in the procedural justice literature (e.g., Bottoms & Tankebe 2012; Jackson 
& Gau 2015; Tankebe 2013; Tyler & Jackson 2013, 2014). These scholars have recently 
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suggested that legitimacy scales that measure obligation to obey and confidence in authority can 
be limited. They suggest that additional measures should be included to produce a more well-
rounded measure of legitimacy. For example, these additional measures might include questions 
about the perceived legality of an authority (i.e., do authorities follow the rules themselves?) 
and normative alignment (i.e., do authorities share the same values as citizens and exercise their 
authority in normatively appropriate ways). Unfortunately, our legitimacy measure does not 
fully capture these additional aspects of legitimacy due to the fact that our data was collected 
before these debates were presented in the literature. We instead utilize a legitimacy measure 
commonly used and cited in earlier research (Tyler 1990). Future researchers may wish to 
replicate our findings with a more sophisticated measure of legitimacy. But even with this 
measure we find legitimacy mediates the effect of procedural justice on compliance as has been 
demonstrated consistently in the literature with both the old and new measure (see Results 
below). 
The social identity scale contained 4-items, measuring strength of identification with 
being a member of the community of law-abiding Australian citizens. Stigmatization was 
another measure of identity, specifically assessing how negative system contact had labeled tax 
offenders with a deviant identity; it comprised 7-items. Taxpayer morality was measured with 
4-items gauging how wrong taxpayers felt it was to evade taxes. This item was included given 
the social identity literature suggests that identification with a group activates the roles and 
responsibilities expected of an individual in that group (Bradford et al 2014). Personal morality 
has also been found to be a correlate of offending behavior so it is important to include it in a 
model predicting compliance (Reisig et al 2014; Tyler 1990). Risk of sanction was a 1-item 
question assessing respondents’ perceptions of the likelihood of being caught evading taxes. 
Our dependent measure was compliance. Compliance was a 6-item measure 
assessing taxpayers’ self-reported compliance behavior. Taxpayers were asked to answer these 
questions by reflecting on how they felt their enforcement experience had affected their 
subsequent taxpaying behavior. We acknowledge a limitation of our study in that we only 
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measured self-reported compliance behavior. However, past research does show a link between 
intentions to comply and actual compliance behavior (Ajzen 1985), and research conducted in 
other legal contexts shows that procedural justice is similarly related to both self-reported and 
actual compliance behavior (e.g., Reisig & Mesko 2009).  
 
Results 
Figure 1 shows a Structural Equation Model (SEM) that allowed simultaneous testing of all our 
research hypotheses when predicting compliance. Structural equation modelling was used 
because it allows simultaneous testing of all inter-relationships between variables in the model; 
regression is unable to do this. The model fit statistics show that the constructed model provides 
a good fit to the data (RMSEA scores are below 0.05; TLI and CFI are both greater than 0.95). 
In this model, respondents’ assessments of the ATO’s use of procedural justice in the 
immediate aftermath of being sanctioned by the ATO (measured at Time 1) is the ultimate 
explanatory variable; the ultimate response variable is self-reported tax compliance behavior 
measured at Time 3. The other variables constitute potential mediators of the procedural justice 
to compliance pathway, crucially measured at Time 2. We can therefore model directly the 
temporal ordering always implied in studies of procedural justice (i.e., procedural justice  
legitimacy  compliance; procedural justice  identity  compliance) but usually represented 
by data collected at one, or at best two, points in time. 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
As can be seen in Figure 1, procedural justice had a statistically significant direct 
relationship with three variables in the model. Those who felt the ATO was more procedurally 
just at Time 1 were more likely to view the ATO as legitimate, were more likely to identify 
strongly as a law-abiding Australian citizen, and were less likely to feel stigmatized by the ATO 
at Time 2.  
There was a moderately strong path from social identity to offending at Time 3 and 
also from legitimacy to offending at Time 3. Stronger identifiers were more likely to say they 
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had complied with their tax obligations, and those who viewed the ATO as more legitimate 
were more likely to report being compliant. The perceived risk of sanction variable at Time 2 
also predicted compliance at Time 3. However, the relationship was in the opposite direction to 
that expected. Respondents who thought there was a greater chance they would be detected 
violating tax laws were less likely to report being compliant; deterrence seems to have a 
counter-productive effect in our model. Importantly, normative concerns seemed to have a 
stronger effect in predicting compliance than perceived risk of sanction (Hypothesis 1 
supported). Finally, the indirect statistical effect of procedural justice on compliance was 
positive and significant (ß=0.10, p<.04). Those who thought the ATO was more procedurally 
just at Time 1 were more likely to report being compliant at Time 3. The fact there was no 
direct path between procedural justice and compliance suggests that the effect of procedural 
justice on compliance was mediated through both legitimacy and social identity (support for 
Hypothesis 2 and 3). Figure 1 also shows that 25% of the variation in compliance scores can be 
explained by all of the included variables in the model. 
Some additional relationships in our model are worthy of mention. Although not the 
primary focus of our study, our model reveals that these relationships are important to further 
our understanding of why procedural justice promotes compliance through identity and 
legitimacy.  The stigmatization variable had an independent and significant effect on 
legitimacy; those who felt more stigmatized by their enforcement experience were less likely to 
view the ATO as legitimate. Interestingly, stigmatization was positively (not negatively) 
associated with the social identity variable. Those who felt more stigmatized by the ATO were 
more likely to identify strongly as a law-abiding Australian.  There was also a strong 
association between social identity and personal taxpaying morality. Respondents who 
identified more strongly as a law-abiding Australian were more likely to view tax avoidance as 
morally wrong. The strongest predictor of compliance was the personal morality variable. 
Those who felt it was morally right to pay tax were more likely to say they were compliant with 
 16 
their tax obligations. Morality was also found to partially mediate the social identity and 
compliance relationship. 
 
Discussion 
The current study aimed to test whether taxpayer offenders’ decisions to comply with their 
subsequent tax obligations were predicted more strongly by normative concerns than concerns 
about being caught for non-compliance. We found that it did, providing support for Hypothesis 
1. We also tested whether legitimacy and social identity mediated the relationship between 
procedural justice and compliance. Again, we found that they both did, supporting Hypotheses 
2 and 3. 
Specifically, we found that perceptions of procedural justice predicted respondents’ 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the ATO; this relationship replicates findings observed in other 
legal contexts (e.g., Reisig et al 2014; Sunshine & Tyler 2003). The experience of procedural 
justice during enforcement also predicted stronger levels of social identity; specifically, 
procedural justice was associated with lower feelings of stigmatization (i.e., deviant identity) 
and higher levels of identification as a law-abiding Australian. These findings also support other 
studies in the literature (e.g., Bradford et al 2014; Murphy & Harris 2007).   
With respect to self-reported offending, taxpayers who perceived a greater chance of 
being caught for engaging in tax evasion were actually less likely to say they had complied with 
their tax obligations. Also predicting compliance was legitimacy, social identity, and personal 
taxpaying morality. Those taxpayers who viewed the ATO as more legitimate, who identified 
more strongly as a law-abiding Australian, and who believed taxpaying was morally right, were 
more likely to report higher levels of compliance. These three factors had stronger effects on 
compliance than the perceived risk of sanction, with personal morality having the strongest 
effect on compliance behavior. Again, these findings support prior research conducted in other 
contexts, and show the specific importance of personal morality as an informal inhibitor of 
criminal behavior (Bradford et al 2015; Tyler 1990; Reisig et al 2014).   
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Importantly, the results show that both legitimacy and social identity are mediators in 
the procedural justice compliance relationship. Feelings of stigmatization were also found to 
play an indirect role in predicting compliance through taxpayers’ perceptions of legitimacy and 
through their identification as law-abiding Australians; higher levels of stigmatization were 
associated with lower levels of perceived legitimacy and higher levels of social identity. 
Considered together, all of these findings suggest that both instrumental and normative 
concerns shape taxpayers’ decisions to re-offend, but normative concerns were more prominent.  
We should acknowledge a limitation of our study. Participant attrition in longitudinal 
research studies is a concern for social scientists because loss of certain participants may result 
in subsequent data collection phases becoming increasingly biased. Attrition may therefore lead 
to unreliable conclusions (Ahern & LeBrocque 2005; Farrington 1991). For example, the 
ultimate dependent variable in our study is self-reported compliance behavior at time 3. One 
might argue that people who are more law-abiding might be more inclined to participate in all 
three phases of the research. This may skew our results toward more compliant responses at 
time 3. In order to explore this possibility, we compared our wave 3 and wave 1 respondents on 
a number of demographic and compliance questions measured at time 1.  We found that the two 
groups did not differ on income level, educational status, gender, English speaking status, or 
perceived risk of sanction for non-compliance.  We did, however, find a small age difference, 
with older people being slightly more likely to continue participation in the study over time. 
Interestingly, we also found that those who participated in wave 3 reported being slightly more 
non-compliant in the past. This latter finding in particular suggests that our wave 3 sample is 
slightly biased towards non-compliance. Our findings must therefore be considered with this in 
mind. However, the bias toward non-compliance does suggest that if normative factors can 
positively influence compliance behavior for more serious offenders then this highlights the 
virtue of authorities considering procedural justice in their disciplinary approach with offenders.  
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Implications for theory and regulatory practice 
Deterrence-based theories of compliance suggest that individuals are primarily motivated to 
comply with laws due to a fear of consequences for doing otherwise. Yet, our results suggest 
that even in a context where one might expect instrumental concerns to dominate, individuals 
seem to be motivated to comply out of an intrinsic motivation to do so. Our respondents all had 
large tax debts as a result of their previous non-compliance, and they had all been through an 
enforcement process. Such experiences are likely to enhance peoples’ perceptions that they will 
be caught again if violating tax laws (this suggestion is supported by the high mean score for 
the risk of sanction variable – see Table A1). However, this enhanced perceived risk of sanction 
played only a small role in predicting subsequent compliance behavior. In fact, our deterrence 
variable seemed if anything to have a counterproductive effect on compliance behavior. Those 
with more fear of being caught reported more non-compliance. This finding supports previous 
research showing that deterrence strategies that are perceived to be unreasonable can result in 
backlash and further non-compliance in the long term (Kagan & Scholz 1984). But they also 
provide support for Anwar and Loughran’s (2011) suggestion that serious offenders can 
respond differently to deterrence than less serious offenders. A more thorough investigation in 
the future of how serious tax offenders respond to deterrence, based on their sanction history, 
would be worthwhile.  
Our findings point to the importance of social identities and personal morality in 
promoting law-abiding behavior. In fact, we found that social identity strongly mediated the 
effect of procedural justice on compliance. We know from other taxation research that people’s 
connections to others do matter; what others in one’s group think about taxpaying can strongly 
influence people’s own views and behaviors. Wenzel (2004, 2005), for example, found that if 
individuals thought other taxpayers paid their fair share of taxes, and saw taxpaying as 
worthwhile, they themselves were more likely to see taxpaying as morally right. We propose 
compliance is likely to benefit as a result of strong identification with law-abiding groups 
because people are motivated to align their behavior to the group’s norms and to act in the 
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interests of the group they belong to. When identification with ‘Australianness’ and being ‘law-
abiding’ in this group is strong, propensity to engage in activities that might harm others in the 
group diminishes (c.f., Bradford et al 2015). In other words, people pay their taxes because of 
the belief it will benefit their group.  
This may partly explain why social identity and personal morality prove to be more 
important predictors of tax compliance behavior than perceptions of the ATO’s legitimacy. 
Legitimacy has been linked to compliance behavior in past research by suggesting that the 
legitimation of legal authorities encourages internalization that it is right to obey the law 
because it is the law (e.g., Tyler 1990; Reisig et al 2007; Murphy, Hinds & Fleming 2008), and 
we did find that legitimacy mediated the effect of procedural justice on compliance. Yet in our 
study social identity seemed to play a more important role in predicting compliance than did 
legitimacy. We suggest that strong group identification promotes a sense of obligation to 
behave in the interests of the group (c.f., Tajfel & Turner 2001; Tyler & Blader 2003). 
It is worth underlining, however, that legitimacy did still have a unique statistical 
association with compliance. Even when controlling for personal morality and social identity 
levels, those who granted the ATO more legitimacy were more likely to say they complied with 
tax laws. Our findings therefore concur with the idea that legitimacy motivates a ‘sense of 
duty’, whereby one is motivated to comply with the laws mandated by an authority, not because 
one believes them to be the right, or because one wishes to avoid behavior harmful to other 
group members, but because one believes that following the dictates of legitimate authority is 
the right thing to do in and of itself. 
Before concluding, we were somewhat surprised that feeling stigmatized resulted in a 
more positive social identity and thus, overall, a positive association with compliance. Labelling 
theorists would predict the opposite, with deviant identities hypothesized to result in distancing 
from the norms of mainstream society (Braithwaite 1989). While our finding may be an 
anomaly, we suggest it could also be explained by the nature of the offending behavior 
exhibited by our taxpayers. The majority of our respondents argued they had become involved 
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in tax avoidance schemes on the advice of tax specialists (see Murphy 2003). They claimed 
their purpose for ‘investing’ in tax schemes was not to defraud the tax system, but to provide an 
investment strategy for their future. They viewed their tax advisors were to blame for their 
situation. If we take these claims at face value, it is perhaps not surprising to observe that 
feeling stigmatized during an enforcement process might result in a stronger affirmation of an 
honest taxpaying identity. Procedurally unfair treatment might challenge taxpayers’ identity as 
an law-abiding citizen. Rather than create a deviant identity that results in further re-offending, 
however, in order to ‘save face’ and protect this sense of self as law-abiding, the resulting 
action is to communicate to others that they are ‘upstanding citizens’, resulting indirectly in 
greater self-reported compliance. Such a process is not totally foreign to criminologists. Sykes 
and Matza’s (1957) research on how offenders attempt to neutralize their offending behavior to 
protect their reputation is but one example. Whether similar effects to ours can be found for 
other types of tax offenders or in other regulatory contexts remains to be seen. 
 
Conclusion 
Our results show that tax authorities should not rely solely, or even primarily, on deterrence-
based strategies to ensure taxpayer compliance. Our findings suggest that enforcement 
strategies that speak to taxpayers’ normative concerns may prove more successful for 
promoting voluntary tax compliance behavior in the long term. These findings support 
conclusions drawn by many procedural justice studies in the literature, and suggest that the 
procedural justice framework examined in our tax study can be generalized across different 
legal contexts. Our findings in particular point to the role that social identity and legitimacy 
plays in explaining why procedural justice has a positive effect on compliance-related behavior. 
If authorities wish to promote compliance with their laws and directives, procedural justice 
seems to provide an effective means to achieve this. This is because procedural justice generates 
both legitimacy and forges social bonds between individuals and the group to which the 
authority represents. This in turn motivates people to bring their views and behavior into line 
 21 
with the expectations of the group. The legitimacy of authorities is important for fostering 
compliance behavior, but our findings suggest that social identity may be an equally important 
mediating mechanism that explains why procedural justice promotes an intrinsic motivation to 
be law-abiding. More work is needed in this space, but future research may reveal that social 
identity processes are more important in procedural justice theory than has previously been 
suspected. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis for concepts used in Figure 1, and basic 
descriptive statistics for latent variables (* reverse coded to create scale). 
 
Concepts and measures  
 
Standardized 
Factor Loadings 
Wave 1 measures  
Procedural Justice (Mean=2.19; SD=0.69; α=0.88)  
The Tax Office treats people as if they can be trusted to do the right thing .67 
The Tax Office respects the individual’s rights as a citizen .71 
The Tax Office gives equal consideration to the views of all Australians .65 
The Tax Office consults widely about how they might change things to 
make it easier for taxpayers to meet their obligations 
.71 
The Tax Office is concerned about protecting the average citizen’s rights .80 
The Tax Office considers the concerns of average citizens when making 
decisions 
.85 
The Tax Office cares about the position of taxpayers .86 
The Tax Office gets the kind of information it needs to make informed 
decisions 
.52 
The Tax Office tries to be fair when making their decisions .80 
The Tax Office goes to great lengths to consult with the community over 
changes to their system 
.65 
  
Wave 2 measures  
ATO Legitimacy (Mean=2.27; SD=0.71; α=0.67)  
The ATO has too much power* .68 
People should follow the decisions of the ATO even if they go against 
what they think is right 
.42 
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As a society we need more people willing to take a stand against the 
ATO* 
.57 
I respect the ATO .85 
  
Social identity (Mean=4.18; SD=0.51; α=0.74)  
What is important to you? The Australian community  .41 
What do you feel pride in? Being a member of the Australian community .42 
What is important to you? Being an honest taxpayer .94 
What do you feel pride in? Being an honest taxpayer .91 
  
Stigmatization (Mean=3.68; SD=0.89; α=0.90)  
Did you think there was some kind of implication about the kind of 
person you are? 
.82 
Did you feel as though you were treated as a bad person? .94 
Did you feel you were treated as though you were likely to commit 
another offence? 
.90 
Did you feel as though negative judgments were made about what kind of 
person you are? 
.95 
Did you feel as though you were accepted as basically law abiding by the 
ATO?* 
.69 
Did you feel as though you were treated as a trustworthy person?* .63 
Did you feel as though you were treated as a criminal? .78 
  
Taxpayer morality (Mean=3.93; SD=0.73; α=0.74)  
Do you think you should honestly declare cash earnings on your tax 
return? 
.79 
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Do you think it is acceptable to overstate tax deductions on your tax 
return?* 
.77 
Do you think working for cash-in-hand payments without paying tax is a 
trivial offence?* 
.75 
Do you think the government should actively discourage participation in 
the cash economy? 
.67 
  
Risk of sanction (Mean=4.17; SD=0.93)  
What do you think the chances are that you will be caught claiming 
$5000 as work deductions when the expenses have nothing to do with 
work? 
n/a 
  
Wave 3 measures  
Compliance (Mean=4.08; SD=0.64; α=0.81)  
Tell us how your experience with the Tax Office has affected your 
taxpaying behavior…… 
 
I now try to avoid paying tax as much as possible* .58 
I no longer declare all of my income* .81 
I now use the tax system in a negative way to recoup the financial losses I 
have incurred* 
.83 
I am now more defiant towards the ATO* .77 
I now look for ways to purposefully cheat the tax system* .85 
I now look for many ways to recoup my financial losses* .66 
  
Chi-square = 1299.53, df = 680, p<.05  
RMSEA = .05  
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CFI = .97  
TLI = .97  
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Table A2. Means and standard deviation scores for each measure. Also reported are 
the bivariate correlations between measures. *p<0.05 
 
 
 
Scale/Variable Mean SD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
1. Procedural Justice  2.19 .69 1 .57* .04 -.41* -.01 -.05 .11*  
2. Legitimacy 2.27 .71  1 .01 -.37* .10 -.07 .22*  
3. Social Identity 4.18 .51   1 .22* .38* .18* .28*  
4. Stigmatization 3.68 .89    1 .18* .22* -.01  
5. Morality 3.93 .73     1 .12* .30*  
6. Deterrence  4.17 .93      1 -.07  
7. Compliance  4.08 .64       1  
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59% 
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35% 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Chi
2 
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df = 578 
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RMSEA = .05 
CFI = .98 
TLI = .97 
*p<.05 
Coefficients are 
standardized 
values 
Figure 1. SEM predicting self-reported tax compliance  
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